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AN UNNECESSARY GRAY AREA:
WHY COURTS SHOULD NEVER CONSIDER RACE
IN CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
KATHRYN BEER*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine, for a moment, that you are the parent of an energetic and
cheerful two-year-old girl.' From the day that your daughter is born, you
are a co-parent in every respect: you help care for her physically and
emotionally - playing with her, feeding her, bathing her, and preparing her
for bed. You provide your daughter with a safe home, surround her with
caring relatives, and attempt to build a loving nuclear family in which she
may be raised. Soon, however, your marriage begins to deteriorate. Your
spouse leaves, taking your daughter to another state, miles away. You fly
out whenever possible, dropping everything in order to be with your
daughter for mere weekends at a time. Although your marriage has been
lost, your daughter is the driving force in pushing you through an
emotionally taxing custody battle.
You are a good parent. You have a full-time job, allowing you to
provide your daughter with not only necessities, but luxuries as well,
including a private school education. You are physically and
psychologically healthy, and enjoy the support of a large extended family.
You are moral and honest, planning to raise your child to be an accepting
woman by immersing her in a spiritual and religious environment.
Licensed psychologists believe that your daughter would thrive under your
care. Perhaps most importantly, your little girl adores you, constantly
smiling as you play with her and read to her.
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2010; B.A., cum laude, Psychology,
Loyola College in Maryland, May 2007.
1 The following hypothetical is based upon the facts of In re Marriage of Gambla, 853 N.E.2d 847
(Ill. 2006), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 693 (2007).
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Secure in the belief that you are the more qualified parent to raise your
daughter in a way that serves her best interests, imagine your shock when
the judge awards sole custody of your daughter to your former spouse. In
disbelief, you cannot understand how the court could reach such a
determination.
In its written decision, the court makes crystal clear its rationale: your
ex-wife is the better parent because she is black and you are not. It is in
your daughter's best interest, the court writes, to reside with her black
mother because your spouse would be better able to teach your daughter,
who is biracial, "to learn to exist . . . in a society that is sometimes hostile
to such individuals." 2 Additionally, the court reasons, your spouse would
be "better able to provide for [your daughter's] emotional needs in this
respect." 3 Incredibly, such race-based determinations are not uncommon in
jurisdictions across the country.
"Despite proclamations that we don't see race, racism continues to
construct divergent social, political and economic realities in America."4
Even as the historic election of Barack Obama swept away "the last racial
barrier in American politics," 5 deeply-rooted concerns about the role of
race in our society permeate laws in ways both obvious and subtle in
twenty-first century America. Race still matters. 6 Although significant
limits have been placed on racial discrimination within the family law
arena, throughout the years,7 state courts across the country have decided
2 In re Marriage of Gambia, 853 N.E.2d at 868.
3 Id.
4 Tanya Washington, Loving Grutter: Recognizing Race in TransRacial Adoptions, 16 GEO.
MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 1, 4 (2005).
5 Adam Nagourney, Obama Elected President as Racial Barriers Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008,
at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/us/politics/05elect.htm? r=1&scp=l&sq=
Barack%200bama%20Elected%20President&st-cse (stating that the last racial barrier in American
politics has been swept away with ease after Barack Obama was elected President).
6 See, e.g., Siri Carpenter, Buried Prejudice: The Bigot in Your Brain, Scientific Am. Mind, Apr.
2008, available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=buried-prejudice-the-bigot-in-
your-brain (demonstrating that even a black civil rights leader like Jesse Jackson cannot escape the
implicit bias that unwittingly exists within people despite efforts to quell explicit displays of prejudice);
Nicholas D. Kristof, What? Me Biased?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at A39, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/30/opinion/30kristof html (suggesting that "while the vast majority of
Americans truly believe in equality and aspire to equal opportunity for all, our minds aren't as
egalitarian as we think they are.").
7 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (declaring a state statute that prohibits people
of different races from marrying unconstitutional under both the Equal Protection Clause and Due
Process Clause); McLaughlin et al. v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 195, 196 (1964) (holding that a Florida
law prohibiting cohabitation between two individuals of different races violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Chip Chiles, A Hand to Rock the Cradle: Transracial
Adoption, the Multiethnic Placement Act, and a Proposal for the Arkansas General Assembly, 49 ARK.
L. REv. 501, 502-03 (1996) (noting that although the number of transracial adoptions rose in the
1960's, this trend was shattered when the National Association of Black Social Workers "derided
transracial adoption as 'genocide' against black people and asserted its categorical opposition to
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many custody cases based on race.8 These courts have justified their
decisions by rationalizing that the child's best interests are served by
awarding custody to a parent whose race matches that of the child,9 and by
downplaying an overt reliance on race in favor of other, more socially
acceptable factors.' 0
This Note proposes that the "best interests" standard should be tailored
to prohibit courts from considering race in custody determinations.
Although race undoubtedly plays a significant role in an individual's
emotional development and acceptance of self, such development and self-
acceptance is not secured - nor is a child's best interest served - simply by
awarding custody to a guardian with whose race the child can more readily
identify. Rather, best interests custody decisions must be made by
determining which guardian will provide a more loving and supportive
environment in which the child can thrive; not simply one in which
members of the household share similar physical characteristics.
While state statutes requiring children to be placed with same-race
guardians have been held unconstitutional, 1 ' state courts have consistently
held that the mere consideration of race in custody determinations is
transracial adoption . . . .").
8 See Eileen M. Blackwood, Note, Race as a Factor in Custody and Adoption Disputes. Palmore v.
Sidoti, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 209, 217 (1985) (stating that many trial courts determine child custody
cases solely on racial factors and some appellate courts use race as a factor to be considered); see also
Myriam Zreczny, Note, Race-Conscious Child Placement: Deviating from a Policy Against Racial
Classifications, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1121, 1122 (1994) (questioning how the consideration of race as
a factor in best interest determinations has survived strict scrutiny, whereas nearly every other race-
based classification practice by a state (excluding affirmative action) does not pass the strict scrutiny
test).
9 See generally Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200,
1203-05 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that placement of a mixed-race child with an adoptive family that
matched his racial characteristics would be in the best interests of the child as opposed to being placed
with a white foster family that had cared for the child and grown attached to him); In re The Petition of
R.M.G et al., 454 A.2d 776, 788, 794 (D.C. 1982) (explaining that although the racial factor was not
argued correctly here, race can be a factor in determining the best interests of a child in adoptive
proceedings).
10 See, e.g., Dansby v. Dansby, 189 S.W.3d 473 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004). In Dansby, the court upheld
the lower court's modification from joint custody of the parties' daughter to sole custody in favor of the
father based on a change in circumstances. Id at 480. Although the father objected to the fact that the
mother was dating white men, the court claimed to base its decision on the mother's alleged drug use
and promiscuity, despite the fact that the father had been arrested and had failed to promptly pay child
support on numerous previous occasions. Id. at 479-80. Parker v. Parker, 986 S.W.2d 557, 558-63
(Tenn. 1999). Parker expressed that race should never be a factor in custody matters, and held that the
trial court properly granted custody to the father based on non-racial factors, despite finding that the
trial court erred in allowing racial testimony during proceedings.
11 See Reisman v. Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs., 843 F. Supp. 356, 364 (W.D. Tenn. 1993)
(finding Tennessee's Human Services Department policy requiring biracial children to be placed with
black and biracial adoptive families unconstitutional); In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967) (holding a state statute prohibiting biracial adoptions as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause).
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permissible and "race-matching preferences" do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 Courts justify reliance
on race by concluding that race is one of many acceptable best interest
factors. Race, it has been held, can guide the court in determining which
parent is better suited to expose the subject child to his or her ethnic
heritage and to assist the subject child in developing his or her cultural
pride.13 However, this Note proposes that allowing race to be used as a best
interests factor increases the risk of courts deciding custody proceedings on
issues not relevant to the cases at hand, extending racial stereotypes, and
ultimately, harming not only families, but the children with whose well-
being those courts are entrusted to protect. Therefore, this Note suggests
that the best interests standard should be modified to explicitly prohibit
courts from considering race in custody determinations.
Part I of this Note explores the basis of the "best interests" standard and
how courts have come to treat race as a factor in determining this standard.
This part briefly introduces the need for and purpose of child custody
proceedings. Next, this part explains that reaching decisions that promote
the child's best interests is the widely accepted general standard amongst
state courts. Further, this part discusses the history of race as a factor in
custody decisions, tracing the courts' use of race in such proceedings from
before the Supreme Court's 1984 holding in Palmore v. Sidotil4 up until
this landmark decision. Finally, Part I explores the effect that Palmore had
on subsequent child custody cases.
Part II discusses the inadequacies of the courts' use of race as a best
interests factor in custody proceedings and how such inadequacies may
actually harm those whom they are meant to protect. This part presents the
opposing side by exploring arguments for the consideration of race in best
interests custody determinations, identifying the rationale behind various
groups' belief that children are better placed with parents and guardians of
12 Zreczny, supra note 8, at 1121. See McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 319-20 (E.D. Pa.
1988). The Court in Pernsley analyzed the Equal Protection argument as applied to foster care
placements. Id. "[T]he goal of making an adequate long-term foster care placement that provides for a
foster child's racial and cultural needs and that is consistent with the best interests of the child, is
indisputably a compelling governmental interest for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at
324. see also Kim Forde-Mazrui, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black and
Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REV. 925, 928 (1994). Forde-Mazrui notes that neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court has forbidden the consideration of race in child placement. Id.
13 See Jones v. Jones, 542 N.W.2d 119, 124 (S.D. 1996) (holding that in custody proceedings it is
proper to take into consideration race as it relates to a child's ethic heritage and the parent's ability to
expose the child to it); see also Davis v. Davis, 658 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (stating
that although race is not a controlling factor in custody disputes, it must be weighed along with the
other elements of family life).
14 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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their own race. This part then argues that the reasoning behind such a
belief is flawed for three main reasons. Part II first suggests that permitting
race to be used in determining a child's best interest can lead to an abuse of
discretion by the courts because judges may base their decisions on
personal biases, or may allow undue weight to be given to race. Next, this
part suggests that allowing race to be considered under the best interests
standard in custody proceedings assumes that a different race guardian will
not be able to facilitate emotional growth in as healthy a manner as a
guardian of the same race as the subject child. Yet, children raised by
parents of races different from themselves are just as happy, well rounded,
and emotionally developed as children raised by parents of their own
race. 15 Finally, this part offers that race as a consideration in best interests
custody determinations supposes that a child's best interests are better
served by a same race guardian because this guardian would enable a child
to develop a stronger cultural identity, thereby promoting racial
stereotyping. However, the race of a parent does not affect a child's
appreciation for or involvement in his or her culture. 16
Part III suggests that the best interests standard be modified to explicitly
exclude race as a possible consideration in custody proceedings and
provides reasoning for this proposal. This part suggests that the
elimination of race as a factor to consider in best interests custody
decisions will likely reduce societal prejudices and racial biases. By
placing children based upon reasons other than race, this Note submits,
courts encourage relationships built on love and nurturing as opposed to
shared physical characteristics, which, in turn, may create a more accepting
and tolerant society. Additionally, this part proposes that by narrowing the
best interests standard to eliminate any consideration of race in custody
determinations, courts will be forced to instead focus on factors that are
more relevant to a child's well being. If no weight may be given to race in
custody proceedings, this Note suggests that judges will have to analyze
more fully the parenting capabilities of each party in order to provide a
15 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 944 (noting that, regarding adoption practices, "[m]any
empirical studies indicate that transracially placed Black children are as well adjusted as their inracially
placed counterparts"); Angela T. McCormick, Transracial Adoption: A Critical View of the Courts'
Present Standards, 28 J. FAM. L. 303, n.l 16 (1994) (suggesting that transracially adopted children may
be better prepared to operate and negotiate in the world around them).
16 Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in
Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163, 1209 (1991) (reporting that studies of minority children adopted by
white families suggest that these children "developed strong senses of racial identity" as compared to
minority children adopted and raised by minority families and minority children raised by their
biological families); Forde-Mazuri, supra note 12, at 945 (refuting the argument that same-race
placement is required for a child to have a positive racial identity).
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decision that will truly be in the subject child's best interest.
I. A BACKGROUND: RACE AND THE 'BEST INTERESTS' STANDARD
Unfortunately, as a result of high divorce ratesl 7 and a growing
number of children born to unmarried parents,18 child custody proceedings
are becoming increasingly prevalent in the United States.19 In these cases,
courts must determine which parent or guardian will retain the rights and
duties that accompany taking custody of the child in question.20 These
rights and duties include providing for the "physical, moral, and mental
well-being of the child" and imply that the guardian receiving custody has
"immediate personal control of the child."21
A. Custody Proceedings and the Child's Best Interests
In determining which guardian will be granted custody of the subject
child, state family courts have unanimously held that the deciding court
"must weigh whether that decision will be in the best interests of the
child,"22 and a majority of states even statutorily require courts to consider
the best interests of the child. 23 However, although the best interests test is
17 Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 53 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 359, 373 (2005) (suggesting that around fifty-percent of all American marriages end in
divorce); Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements
and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 194 (1998) (stating that
approximately half the marriages in the United States will end in divorce).
18 See R.A. Lenhardt, Elizabeth B. Cooper, Sheila R. Foster & Sonia K. Katyal, Forty Years of
Loving: Confronting Issues of Race, Sexuality, and the Family in the Twenty-First Century, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2673 (2008) ("[A]lmost 40 percent of America's children are born to
unmarried parents.") (quoting Stephanie Coontz, Op-Ed., Taking Marriage Private, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2007, at A23); see also Rebecca Moulton, Who's Your Daddy?: The Inherent Unfairness of the
Material Presumption for Children of Unmarried Parents, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 698, 704 (2009)
(examining the increases in unmarried birth rates by various ethnic groups).
19 See Robert B. Weinstock, Note, Palmore v. Sidoti: Color-Blind Custody, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 245,
248 (1984) (discussing several situations in which courts must determine rights and duties regarding
child custody); see also Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Concerns at the Margins of Supervised Access to
Children, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 201, 207 (2007). ("The growth of intractable custody litigation has also
been fueled by the legal context in which custody issues are decided.").
20 Weinstock, supra note 19, at 248 (explaining that "[i]f a family dissolves as a result of death,
divorce, or separation, courts must determine who will retain the various rights and duties regarding
custody of the child in question."); see Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill, 104, 110 (1925) (stating that "the court
granting a divorce shall have full and continuing jurisdiction" to make orders with respect to the care,
custody, and support of the child in question).
21 Weinstock, supra note 19, at 248.
22 Determining the Best Interests of the Child: Summary of State Laws, CHILD WELFARE INFO.
GATEWAY, Apr. 2008, at 1, available at www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws policies/statutes/
best interest.cfm [hereinafter Summary of State Laws]; see Weinstock, supra note 19, at 249 ("[C]ourts
unanimously agree that the best interest and welfare of the child are paramount.").
23 Weinstock, supra note 19, at 249 ("A majority of the states statutorily mandate that courts
consider the 'best interests of the child' in custody proceedings."). See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. §
276
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so widely accepted, there exists no uniform definition of what constitutes
the child's "best interests." 24 Instead, each state establishes its own factors
that courts must evaluate when concluding which custodial guardian would
better serve the child.25 Factors to be considered when determining a
child's best interests typically include: age and gender of the child; physical
and mental health of the child and the guardians; lifestyle choices of the
guardians; emotional connection between the child and the guardians;
ability of the guardians to provide the child with necessities such as food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care; child's connection to school, home,
community, and places of worship; and preference of the child.26
While statutes in most states list specific factors that the court must
consider in making best interests determinations, many state statutes allow
the court to consider any factor it deems necessary in reaching its
decision.27 For example, Michigan state courts permit judges to include
"any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute" when determining the child's best interests,28 and Virginia
state courts allow the consideration of "other factors as the court deems
necessary and proper to the determination." 29 As a result, many judges
have free reign to, and often do, base their child custody decisions on
"personal discretion and common sense." 30
240 (McKinney 1977) (stating that the court shall enter orders for custody and support with regard to
the best interests of the child).
24 Weinstock, supra note 19, at 249 ("Despite the prevalence of the best interests test, there is no
clear definition of what constitutes the 'child's best interests."').
25 See id. "Several state statutes suggest factors for courts to consider when determining custody.";
see also Kathy T. Graham, How the ALI Principles Help Eliminate Gender and Sexual Orientation Bias
from Custody Determinations, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 323, 324 (2001). "The Legislatures of
many states have adopted criteria for the decision maker to consider in determining best interests."
26 Summary of State Laws, supra note 22, at 3. Also to be considered in some states are the ways in
which parents interact with each other during visitation and the possible existence of any form of abuse
by a parent. Graham, supra note 25, at 324-25. The conduct, marital status, income, social
environment, or lifestyle of a parent may also be considered in some states if these factors may
adversely impact the child.
27 See, e.g., Summary of State Laws, supra note 22, at 16 (listing Michigan's "best interests of the
child" statute); see also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-06.2(1) (2000) (stating that the child's best
interests factors include "any other factors considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute").
28 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (2000).
29 Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (2005)).
30 Weinstock, supra note 19, at 249. The best interests standard allows the judge to rule based on
his or her personal idea of what is in the child's best interest, even though such a belief might not be
accurate; consequently, this free reign can lead to judicial abuse because the judge may allow personal
beliefs to influence his decision. See Graham, supra note 25, at 325. The broadness of the best interests
standard makes it possible for judge's ethical and moral beliefs to influence his or her decision.
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B. The Courts' Use ofRace as a Factor in Best Interests Custody
Proceedings
a. Pre-Palmore: Free Reign for the Courts
Although "[j]udicial consideration of race in a custody proceeding lacks
any [state] statutory support," 31 many courts have given significant weight
to the race of a party seeking custody when making their decisions.
Consider In re B.,32 a 1977 New York case, in which a black child placed
in the care of a white foster mother became the subject of a custody battle.
The child's birth parents, who had previously abandoned him upon
becoming heavily involved with drugs but who claimed to have
subsequently rehabilitated themselves, petitioned for custody of their son.33
In holding that the child's birth parents were to be awarded custody, the
family court noted, "the concept of "[b]lack pride" is an important one ...
[and] this child's self-image and acceptance of his [b]lack identity are
crucial to his adjustment in life and his place in the world."34
Courts have considered not only the race of parents or guardians seeking
custody in determining a child's best interests, but also the race of non-
petitioning spouses and paramours of parties seeking custody, with whom
the child in question would interact on a daily basis. For example, in the
1974 case of White v. Appleton,35 where both mother and father were
white, an Alabama Appellate Court upheld the lower court's award of
custody to the father upon the mother's remarriage to a black man. The
court suggested that placing the child in the home of a mother with whom
the child had not spent much time and a man of a different race could be a
"traumatic experience." 36 Additionally, in Russell v. Russell,37 decided in
1979, an Illinois Appellate Court noted, in upholding the lower court's
decision to award custody to the father, that the mother's remarriage to a
31 Weinstock, supra note 19, at 251.
32 391 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1977) (awarding custody to the natural parents while noting the importance
of black pride as important to a child's self-image and acceptance).
33 Id. at 812. The birth mother in this case also sought custody of two other children she had
abandoned, but who had been placed together in the foster care of a black family.
34 Id. at 814.
35 304 So.2d 206 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974) (awarding custody to the father after the mother's
remarriage to a black man).
36 Id. at 209.
37 399 N.E.2d 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (affirming a lower's court decision of awarding custody to




black man would create potential social problems for the subject child.38
Courts' justifications for custody decisions based upon race run from
semi-plausible rationalizations to unabashed racism. Before Palmore, in
those cases where adverse parties to custody cases were of the same race
but one party had entered into a relationship with an individual of another
race, courts cited societal prejudices as the basis for their best interests
determinations, claiming that the prospective guardian's interracial
marriage could have a negative effect on the subject child.39 Courts
additionally suggested, in cases where potential custodians were of
different races, that a biracial or black child's emotional well-being would
be better served by living with non-Caucasian guardians because such
guardians could help the child develop his or her identity and assist in the
child's connection to his or her heritage.40 Shockingly, in the 1976 case of
Beazley v. Davis,41 before the Nevada Supreme Court overturned the order,
the district court judge awarded custody to the black father after looking at
photographs of the subject children and determining that they possessed
'Negroid' characteristics.42
b. An Attempt at Change: Palmore v. Sidoti
In 1984, after decades of race-based custody decisions, the United States
Supreme Court finally addressed the issue head-on in the landmark case
Palmore v. Sidoti.43 Palmore involved a custody dispute between white
parents from Florida.44 Following their divorce, the mother was awarded
custody and remained sole custodian for over a year until the father filed a
petition seeking to modify the prior judgment, citing a change in
circumstances - the mother's cohabitation with and subsequent marriage to
a black man - as grounds for a modification of custody.45 A Florida Circuit
Court noted that the mother had "chosen for herself and for her child, a
38 Id. at 214 (reasoning that since the mother's remarriage was interracial, the child could be
"adversely affected by social pressures as he grew older. . . .").
39 See, e.g., Weinstock, supra note 19, at 252 (discussing that some jurisdictions have adopted the
view that the potential custodian's interracial relationship could have harmful effects on a child); see
also White v. Appleton, 304 So.2d 206, 209 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974) (stating that placing a child in a
home with mother and a strange male of different race could be a traumatic experience for children).
40 In the Matter of B., 391 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1977) (recognizing that "the concept of 'Black Pride' is
important and "the child's self-image and acceptance of his Black identity are crucial to his adjustment
in life. . . ."); Blackwood, supra note 8, at 219 (discussing the issues of identity and self worth among
children as a result of imposing racial differences upon adoption).
41 Beazley v. Davis, 545 P.2d 206 (Nev. 1976).
42 Id. at 207.
43 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
44 Id. at 430.
45 Id. at 430.
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lifestyle unacceptable to the father and to society," and awarded custody to
the father.46 Without offering an opinion, the Second District Court of
Appeals affirmed and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 47
The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the existence of social
intolerance against children from racially mixed households, held that
"[t]he effects of racial prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial
classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural
mother found to be an appropriate person to have such custody."48
Reversing the trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court established that it is a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to make
a custody determination solely on the basis of race and awarded custody
again to the mother.49
c. Post-Palmore: Still Wading in Murky Waters
Palmore was undoubtedly a step in the right direction, as the Court
finally officially recognized that "[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach
of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."50
However, this far from settled the matter because the holding in Palmore
was limited to the facts in the case. 51 That is, race may not be used as the
determining factor where a court must decide whether to remove a child
from the home of a natural parent who, despite having engaged in a
relationship with an individual of a different race, is an otherwise fit
guardian and would provide the child with a healthy and supportive
environment. 52
As a result of the narrowness of Palmore, race as a factor in
determining a child's best interests continues to play an important role in
many custody cases, even today. For example, Palmore failed to address
cases in which natural parents, each of a different race, seek custody of
their common child.53 Similarly, no conclusion on race as a best interests
46 Id. at 431 (citing R. at 84 (emphasis added)).
47 Id.
48 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
49 Id at 432 (stating that the trial court was "entirely candid and made no effort to place its holding
on any ground other than race").
50 Id at 433.
51 Weinstock, supra note 19, at 260 (finding that Palmore was limited to situations where the court
is considering removing the child from the natural patent even though the parent is a fit guardian).
52 Id. "[I]n a child custody proceeding between natural parents of the same race, the effects of
racial prejudice resulting from the mother's interracial relationship cannot justify removing a child from
the custody of the natural and fit mother."
53 Id. at 261 (noting that the Court's narrow decision did not address whether racial classifications
are permissible in custody disputes involving contesting parties of different race).
280
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factor was reached with regard to parties of a race different than the subject
child seeking to gain custody of the child against the wishes of an adverse
potential custodian of the same race as the child.54 Consequently, many
courts view Palmore's absence of language forbidding racial consideration
(as opposed to racial determination) to mean that, so long as the court gives
race the same weight as it would any other best interests factor, such may
be considered.55
Concerning situations in which different race parents of biracial
children are engaged in a custody battle, consider In re Marriage of
Gambla,56 the case on which this Note's opening hypothetical situation is
based. Recently, in 2006, an Illinois trial court awarded custody to the
subject biracial child's black mother instead of her white father, reasoning
that the mother could provide the child "with a 'breadth of cultural
knowledge' as to her African-American heritage." 57 The court further
noted that the child would need to "learn to exist as a biracial woman in a
society that is sometimes hostile to such individuals and that [the mother]
would be better able to provide for [the child's] emotional needs in this
respect."58 Although the trial court found the parties to be equal on all other
best interests factors that the state statute required it to consider, the court
held that the factor of race tipped the scales in favor of the mother.59 An
Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, with one justice dissenting.60
Unfortunately, as Palmore did not rule on whether the factor of race might
be at least considered in deciding a child's best interests in custody
decisions, the Gambla decision was denied certiorari by the Supreme
Court.61
With regard to situations in which one guardian is of a different race
than the subject child, and the contesting guardian is of the same race as the
child, consider Davis v. Berks County Children & Youth Servs. 62 In Davis,
54 Id. (mentioning that the Court's narrow decision did not address whether racial classifications
can be used in a custody dispute involving contesting parties of different races and a child of the same
race as one of the parties).
55 See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 621 N.W.2d 70, 83 (Neb. 2000) ("[A] child's racial identity is one
factor among several that may be considered in making custody determinations."); see also Ebirim v.
Ebirim, 620 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000) ("[R]ace is but one factor among several to be
considered in custody determinations.").
56 853 N.E.2d 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2006).
57 Id. at 868.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 871 (stating that although both parents were good parents, the evidence showed that the
mother could "ever so slightly better contribute" to the child's overall well being).
60 Id. at 871-72.
61 Gambla v. Woodson, 128 S. Ct. 39 (2007).
62 465 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1983).
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decided in 1983, Pennsylvania's Supreme Court ruled on an appeal from
the trial court's award of custody of a biracial child63 to a black couple over
a white couple. 64 The white couple petitioning for custody developed a
close bond with the subject child over the course of his life, cared him for
frequently, and eventually took him in to live with them.65 The black
couple, on the other hand, had only been in temporary custody of the child
upon the death of the child's mother.66 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
not only permitted the consideration of race in determining custody in this
case, but encouraged it, reasoning that "a child of one race living in an
environment consisting totally or predominately of another race may face
numerous psychological and social problems." 67 The court further noted
that the award of custody to guardians who share the race of the child
would help establish the child's personal and social identity.68 Like
Gambla, Davis was decided based upon courts' reasoning that a child's
interests are better served when custody is awarded to a guardian more
racially similar to the child because that guardian can more adequately
promote the child's self-acceptance and emotional growth.69 The court in
Davis, like that in Gambla, made sure to focus on the development of the
child in question and not merely the prevalence of societal prejudices
against minorities. 70 Further, the court did not consider race to the
exclusion of all other factors. 71 Therefore, although Davis was decided
before Palmore, because Palmore forbid only custody decisions based
solely upon the effects of racial prejudice, 72 it is likely that Davis would
63 Id. at 617.
64 Id. at 618. Custody was actually awarded to Berks County Children and Youth Services foster
home agency, which "in the posture of this case, meant that physical custody would be with the [black
couple]." Id.
65 Id. at 617.
66 Id. at 617-18.
67 Weinstock, supra note 19, at 264-65 (quoting Davis v. Berks County Children and Youth
Servs., 465 A.2d 614, 623 (Pa. 1983)).
68 Weinstock, supra note 19, at 265 (quoting Davis, 465 A.2d at 624) (suggesting that placing a
child with a family of his or her own race would create a sense of personal and social identity within the
child).
69 Davis, 465 A.2d at 624 ("The major advantage of racial matching is, of course, providing an
atmosphere in which to instill in the child a sense of personal and social identity.").
70 Id. at 628. While acknowledging that racial prejudices do exist, the court instead focused their
discussion on the fact that, "[in comparison with the environment at the [black couple's] residence, the
situation with the [white couple] does not seem to be very conducive to the inculcation of a sense of
racial identity in [the child]." Id. To buttress this opinion, the court cited the lack of blacks in schools in
the white couple's all-white neighborhood and the child's lack of black identity. Id
71 Id. at 621. The court also considered the age of the parties petitioning for custody (the white
couple were over the age of seventy-five whereas the black couple were under the age of fifty) as well
as the well-founded policy that siblings be raised together (the subject child's two half-siblings were in
the custody of the black couple). Id.
72 Weinstock, supra note 19, at 260. "In Palmore the Court unequivocally, but narrowly, held that
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survive the Palmore standard.73
Clearly, "[d]espite the United States Supreme Court's rare foray into
the arena of family law to prohibit the use of race as the sole factor to
determine child custody [in Palmore], the Court declined to define the
relationship between the best interests test and race." 74 Consequently, the
question remains open to interpretation and, as such, lower courts are left
without clear direction on how to approach this issue.75
II. CURRENT PROBLEMS:
THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD MUST BE MODIFIED TO EXCLUDE RACE
AS A FACTOR BECAUSE PERMITTING RACE TO BE CONSIDERED IN
CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS MAY Do MORE HARM THAN GOOD
It would be inaccurate to argue that race-based custody determinations
always result in harm to the subject child. Of course there are numerous
situations in which children thrive under the care of a guardian awarded
custody by a court that considered race when making its decision.
However, the use of race in best interests determinations can certainly
negatively affect the subject children in custody proceedings. Indeed, the
pros of eliminating race as a factor in the child's best interests standard far
outweigh the cons.76 Therefore, the best interests standard should be
modified so that race may never be a considered factor in custody
proceedings.
While this Note proposes the elimination of race as a consideration in the
best interests determinations of custody decisions, opposition to this
proposal indeed exists. For example, the National Association of Black
in a child custody proceeding between natural parents of the same race, the effects of racial prejudice
resulting from the mother's interracial relationship cannot justify removing a child from the custody of
the natural and fit mother."
73 Id. at 266. "The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Davis, that race should be considered
in adoption disputes between parties of different races, will probably survive the Supreme Court's
decision in Palmore."
74 Jo Beth Eubanks, Transracial Adoption in Texas: Should the Best Interests Standard Be Color-
Blind?, 24 ST. MARY'S L. J. 1225, 1256 (1993) (emphasis added).
75 Id. (criticizing the Supreme Court's failure to provide definite guidance to lower courts); see
generally Twila L. Perry, Power, Possibility and Choice: The Racial Identity of Transracially Adopted
Children, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 215, 218 (2003) (reviewing HAWLEY FOGG-DAVIS, The Ethics of
Transracial Adoption).
76 See generally Andrew Morrison, Transracial Adoption: The Pros and Cons and the Parents'
Perspective, 20 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 167, 203 (2004) (suggesting, after looking at - among other
things - the psychological effect of black or biracial children living with white adoptive families, that
the advantages of transracial adoption are greater than the disadvantages, as such adoption would likely
help to reduce racism and create a healthier, more accepting society); see also Forde-Marzuri, supra
note 12, at 951-53 (noting the potential advantages of black children living with white parents).
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Social Workers (NABSW), according to a 1972 position paper, took a
fervent stand against placing black children in white homes for any
reason. 77 The paper stated:
[T]he nurturing of self identity is a prime function of the family. The
incongruence of a white family performing this function for a Black
child is easily recognized ....
In our society, the developmental needs of Black children are
significantly different from those of white children. Black children
are taught, from an early age, highly sophisticated coping techniques
to deal with racist practices perpetrated by individuals and
institutions .... Only a Black family can transmit the emotional and
sensitive subtleties of perception and reaction essential for a Black
child's survival in a racist society . . .. We repudiate the fallacious
and fantasied reasoning of some that whites adopting Black children
will alter that basic character. 78
As a result of such beliefs, the NABSW argues that black children
should never be placed with white families purely because of the difference
in race between child and guardian. 79 The NABSW also proposes that
white parents should never be awarded custody of biracial children because
"society and those around such children will treat them as [b]lack and,
consequently, these children also need to identify positively as [b]lack and
cope with racial prejudice."80 Should courts accept these arguments, the
NABSW suggests, not only will black and biracial children's best interests
be served, but so will the interests of the black community as a whole. 81
Just as the NABSW takes such a vehement stand in their belief that race
should not only be considered but should be controlling in best interests
77 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 926 (quoting from NABSW's position paper, which
expresses such opposition to interracial adoption); Asher D. Isaacs, Interracial Adoption: Permanent
Placement and Racial Identity -- An Adoptee's Perspective, 14 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 126, 129 (1995)
(summarizing NABSW's stance on the issue of interracial adoption).
78 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 926.
79 Id at 926-27 ("The National Association of Black Social Workers has taken a vehement stand
against the placement of Black children in white homes for any reason."); see Isaacs, supra note 77, at
129 ("Black children belong physically, psychologically and culturally in Black families in order that
they receive the total sense of themselves and develop a sound projection of their future.").
80 Forte-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 927.
81 Id. "The association claims that, by raising Black children to affiliate with the dominant culture,
transracial placement removes these children from Black culture and dislocates them from the Black
community. In this way, the NABSW argues, transracial placement constitutes 'cultural genocide."'
Isaacs, supra note 77, at 129. "The NABSW opposes interracial adoption because it believes that such
adoptions are against the best interests of Black people, in general, and Black children, in particular."
284
AN UNNECESSARYGRAYAREA
custody determinations, so too do those who argue that race should never
be considered in custody proceedings. 82 This Note explores the latter view,
demonstrating how a court's consideration of race when determining a
child's placement is not beneficial to the petitioning parties or the child
involved and should, therefore, be excluded from the best interests
standard.
There are three main reasons why the best interests standard should be
modified to prohibit court's from considering race in child custody
proceedings. First, this Note suggests that allowing courts to consider race
under the best interests standard in custody cases can lead to an abuse of
discretion by the presiding judge. If judges are permitted to consider race,
they may base their decisions on personal biases or allow undue weight to
be given to race. 83 Second, this Note proposes that permitting courts to
consider race in determining a child's best interests assumes that a different
race guardian will not be able to facilitate emotional growth in as healthy a
manner as a same race guardian. However, this Note contends that just
because a guardian is of the same race as the subject child, it does not
follow that such a guardian will be better equipped to assist that child in
developing emotionally. This contention is supported by findings that
children living with custodial parents of a different race are just as fulfilled,
self-assured and content as children raised by parents of their own race.84
Finally, this Note posits that permitting race to be considered in best
interests determinations supposes that same-race guardians would enable a
child to develop a stronger cultural identity than different race guardians,
thereby promoting racial stereotypes. However, research suggests that
children raised by parents of a race different than their own may just as
easily develop a healthy sense of cultural identity as those raised by
guardians whose race matches their own.85 For all of these reasons, this
82 See, e.g., Carol R. Goforth, "What is She?" How Race Matters and Why it Shouldn't, 46
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 108 (1996) (opposing racial classifications by government agencies); L. Darnell
Weeden, Creating Race-Neutral Diversity in Federal Procurement in a Post-Adarand World, 23
wHiTrIER L. REv. 951, 961-62 (2002) (arguing that governments cannot fairly take race into account
and, therefore, it should not be considered in the affirmative action decisions of the government).
83 Gayle Pollack, The Role of Race in Child Custody Decisions Between Natural Parents Over
Biracial Children, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 603, 612 (1997). "The lack of structure over the
judicial consideration of race in custody cases allows for judges' personal or unconscious biases to play
a role in their decision-making."; cf Weeden, supra note 82, at 961. "[R]acism in our society is so
prevalent that governmental institutions simply cannot be trusted to judge people fairly when race is a
factor."
84 See Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 503, 536 (1984) (reviewing the findings of several interracial adoption studies); see also
Morrison, supra note 76, at 191-93 (summarizing the arguments and findings that demonstrate
interracial adoption benefits the children).
85 See Bartholet, supra note 16, at 1224-25 ("[A Feigelman and Silverman study] showled] that
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Note concludes, the best interests standard should be tailored to prohibit the
consideration of race in custody determinations.
A. Race as a Best Interests Factor Can Lead to Abuses ofJudicial
Discretion
The best interests standard should be modified to proscribe race as a
permissible factor in custody decisions because permitting race to enter
into a judge's determination also permits an abuse of discretion by the
courts. Although the broad nature of the best interests standard provides a
way in which courts may consider any factor that will affect the child's
well being, it also leaves much to the presiding judges' discretion.86 For
this reason, "the subjective interpretations and applications of the 'needs'
of the child . . . are subject to very different interpretations" 87 and may
allow judges to consider factors, such as race, which may not truly affect a
child's welfare. Permitting courts to consider race in determining a child's
best interests is, in essence, permitting judges to contemplate racial
prejudices and personal biases when making decisions, even if such are
unintentionally considered. 88 While it is reasonable to assume that these
stereotypes often subconsciously influence a judge's determination, cases
have been decided in which the court did little or nothing to hide the weight
given to race.89 Even where courts do not blatantly rely on race, however,
black children raised in white homes are comfortable with their blackness and also uniquely
comfortable in dealing with whites."); Richard P. Barth et al., Predicting Adoption Disruption, 33 Soc.
WoRK 227, 229 (1988) (finding that racial differences between parent and adopted child is not related
to adoption disruption).
86 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 939 (describing the best interests standard as "subjective"
and "discretionary" in nature); Howard, supra note 84, at 503 (stating that "the [best interests] test is so
general and vague that it provides no standard at all, and thus no guidance for decision-making."). See
generally Reisman v. Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs., 843 F. Supp. 356, 364 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (noting
that best interests adoption placement decisions of black or mixed-race children are subjective).
87 Reisman, 843 F. Supp. at 364. In Reisman, the white foster parents of a biracial baby girl
brought suit on behalf of the baby and all others similarly situated against the Tennessee Department of
Human Services, claiming the Department's longstanding policy of placing children of mixed heritage
with either black or bi-racial families infringed upon the children's constitutional rights. Id. at 357-58.
The court held that the Department's policy "violate[d] the equal protection rights of the bi-racial
children in the class involved in this case." Id. at 364.
88 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 939 ("By leaving the use of race and its relative weight to
the discretion of the court, the best-interests standard allows the judge's own personal and cultural
biases to influence her decision."); see also Graham, supra note 25, at 325 ("A decisionmaker's own
moral and ethical beliefs will likely influence this decision, even when the decisionmaker believes that
they do not."); Rashmi Goel, From Tainted to Sainted: The View of Interracial Relations as Cultural
Evangelism, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 489, 521 (2007) ("[R]ace inadvertently informs judicial decisions, even
if judges attempt to be colorblind in their decisions. Judges have preconceived 'value systems, cultural
biases, and stereotypical beliefs' that can influence their judgment, particularly if judges are not vigilant
in their self-awareness of possible biases they harbor.").
89 See generally Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 940 (citing Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of
Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977)) (affirming the decision of a lower court to
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such a factor may still play a prominent role in custody decisions. Where,
as now, the consideration of race is permitted so long as it is not
determinative, a court may attempt to downplay its reliance on race and
instead focus on other factors to justify a custody decision. Indeed,
although courts, in their holdings, claim that race may not be the
determinative factor in deciding a child's best interests, undue weight is
often given to race.90
With the Supreme Court's decision in Palmore, "the use of race as a
dispositive factor seems to have fallen by the wayside. Instead, it remains
one of many factors for courts to consider when weighing the child's best
interests." 91 However, numerous commentators have suggested that the
"explicit race test has merely been hidden within the 'best interests of the
child' test."92 Such practices can have adverse effects because, although
courts recognize that race may not be weighed "to the exclusion of all other
factors," 93 it may be difficult for appellate courts, who receive appeals from
custody decisions, to determine whether race was indeed the unspoken
determinative factor in the lower court's holding. 94 "Consequently, an
appellate court may be reluctant to overturn a trial court's custody decree
on mere speculation that race played a predominant role in the trial court's
custody determination." 95 Instead, the appellate court might opt to justify
the lower court's decision by highlighting non-racial factors to suggest that
the guardian being denied custody is unfit or unstable and thereby
rationalizing the lower court's holding.96 Further, it is impossible to get a
allow removal of a black child from the home of his white foster parents on the basis of race in order to
"avoid the potentially tragic possibility of placing a child in a home with parents who will not be able to
cope with the child's problems"); Weinstock, supra note 19, at 261-62 (stating that race is an important
consideration in multiracial adoption disputes and therefore should be permissible).
90 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 939 (finding that although courts that consider race in child
placement proceedings typically conclude that race may only be one of many factors, excessive weight
is often given to race); see also Graham, supra note 25, at 325 (suggesting that although a judge may
state that his or her decision was based upon the appropriate facts and factors, the broadness of the
standard allows personal biases to sometimes play the larger role than those acceptable factors).
91 Goel, supra note 88, at 521 (emphasis added).
92 Id. "[Tihe best interests test does not specify the relevance of race. Thus, judges have ample
opportunity to overlook, under-consider, or affirmatively hide the role of race in their custody
decisions." Id. (quoting Pollack, supra note 83, at 611-12).
93 Weinstock, supra note 19, at 253.
94 See id. (discussing the difficult task that appellate courts have in assessing "the weight that lower
courts accorded the interracial relationship"); see also Timothy P. Glynn, Note, The Role of Race in
Adoption Proceedings: A Constitutional Critique of the Minnesota Preference States, 77 MINN. L. REV.
925, 939-40 (1993) (highlighting the broad discretion given to judges to consider race and the lack of a
consensus of how trial judges should weigh race in adoption proceedings).
95 Weinstock, supra note 19, at 253.
96 Id. "Appellate courts have avoided determining the weight that the trial court gave racial factors
by emphasizing other nonracial factors and deferring to the lower court's discretion."
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true idea of how many cases are determined strictly based on race; there
likely have been numerous cases decided in which race was given
significantly more weight than any other factor, but from which the parties
involved did not appeal.97
Thus, the best interests standard should be modified to exclude the
consideration of race in custody determinations. By leaving room for
judges' own personal prejudices to enter into the decision-making process
and by allowing courts to downplay the weight given to race by using other
factors to point to a guardian's unfitness, the use of race in child custody
best interests decisions can lead to an abuse of discretion by the presiding
court.
B. Race as a Best Interests Factor Assumes that Same Race Placement
Leads to Greater Emotional Development of the Subject Child98
The best interests standard should be modified to eliminate race as a
factor in custody determinations, as it does not follow that because a
guardian is of the same race as the subject child, such a guardian will be
able to facilitate emotional growth in a more beneficial manner than a
different race guardian. Proponents of the inclusion of race as a factor in
best interests determinations claim that children of a minority race will be
confronted with specific societal prejudices and discrimination, and
guardians of a minority race will be better equipped to help these children
respond to the pain caused by such treatment than non-minority
guardians.99 Therefore, permitting race to be considered as a best interests
factor assumes that awarding custody of the subject child to a same race
97 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 942 (discussing how "there many have been countless cases
in which race overwhelmingly determined the outcome"); see also Potter v. Potter 127 N.W.2d 320,
329 (1964) (affirming the trial courts' decision finding that no evidence of race had been considered
when a divorced women remarried a black man and was not granted custody of her child).
98 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984) (holding that the white natural parents vying for
custody of a white child and the societal racial prejudices that resulted from the mother's interracial
relationship could not be considered in custody determinations); see also Zreczny, supra note 8, at
1130-31 (noting that in custody disputes between same-race guardians brought about because one
parent engaged in an interracial relationship, courts have stated that the parent's interracial relationship
is irrelevant); Pollack, supra note 83, at 346 (finding that "[t]he implications of Palmore for the context
of biracial children ... are unclear.").
99 See Reisman v. Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs., 843 F. Supp. 356, 360 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (stating
that in transracial adoption proceedings "the preference for a black family over white, all other things
being equal, is based upon the belief that the bi-racial child will encounter prejudices as a person of
mixed race and that their black parents are in a position to help them respond to that pain and adjust to
it."); see also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 926 (discussing the National Association of Black Social
Workers statement in a 1972 position paper, that "Black children in white homes are cut off from the
healthy development of themselves as Black people, which development is the normal expectation and
only true humanistic goal").
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guardian will result in a healthier, more emotionally developed child.
However, children raised by different race guardians are just as happy, well
rounded, and emotionally developed as those children who are raised by
parents of their own race.100 Indeed, children raised by different race
custodians "'grow up healthy, comfortable in both communities.' 'They
are people who understand their own identities and are comfortable with
them."'lot
Admittedly, as noted in Reisman v. Tennessee Dep't of Human Sers.,
decided in 1993, supporters of race-matching validly argue that "typically
black Americans have experienced [things like prejudice and
discrimination] day to day throughout their lives and have some advantages
over white Americans who may have not experienced those same
confrontations and confusion." 102 However, the ability of different race
guardians to assist the subject child in developing emotionally despite this
inexperience becomes evident upon review of several studies of minority
children adopted by families of a race different from themselves. Although
these studies deal with children involved in adoption practices (and not
specifically in custody proceedings), they are useful for the purposes of this
Note because they examine the psychological and emotional effects that
children living with guardians of a race different than their own generally
experience.
Adoption proceedings (including transracial adoptions) are similar to
child custody proceedings in that both abide by the best interests standard
and are governed by state statutes that do not explicitly include race as a
factor to be considered.103 These studies suggest that, in general,
transracially adopted children (black or biracial children adopted by white
families) develop well emotionally. 104 For example, empirical studies
100 See Reisman, 843 F. Supp. at 361 (citing R. at 1:32-33) (describing that Dr. Rita Simon, who
completed a study researching the affects of transracial adoption, found that being raised by white
families does not have an adverse affect on non-white children); see also Edel v. Edel, 97 Mich. App.
266, 272 (1980) (noting that "there has been a marked increase in the United States in recent years of
interracial marriages and trans-racial adoptions, and sociological studies establish that children raised in
a home consisting of a father and mother who are of different races do not suffer from this
circumstance.").
101 Reisman, 843 F. Supp. at 361 (citing R. at 1:39).
102 Id. at 360 (citing R. at 1:211).
103 See, e.g., NY DOM. REL. § 114 (2009) (articulating the best interests standard and making no
mention of race as a factor to be considered); see also Howard, supra note 84, at 516 (noting that
"[a]doption is governed by the best interests principle, and most adoption statutes make no mention of
race.").
104 See, e.g., Lucille J. Grow & Deborah Shapiro, Black Children-White Parents: A Study of
Transracial Adoption, Soc. WORK, 412 (1975) ("A study was made of black or partly black children . .
. who had been in the homes of their white adoptive parents for at least three years . . . and the rate of
success was 77 percent."; see also Howard, supra note 84, at 536 ("The studies indicate that
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conducted by a "diverse group of researchers that included blacks and
whites, critics and supporters of transracial adoption," present "an
overwhelming endorsement of transracial adoption." 05 One such study
found that a child's race contributed to familial problems in only thirteen-
percent of families studied.106 Another found that being raised by non-
white families does not have a negative effect on adopted non-white
children.107
Not only does the consideration of race in best interests determinations
fail to enhance the child's well being, but race as a best interests factor
could even harm the subject child. Consider McLaughlin v. Pernsley,os in
which a two and one-half year-old black child, Raymond, suffered deep
clinical depression after an adoption agency removed him from his white
foster parents with whom he had lived for two years and transferred him to
a black foster family.109 As evidenced by Raymond's severe emotional
upset due to removal from his white foster parents in Pernsley, this Note
suggests that a child's interests are not served simply because a parent or
guardian is of a certain race. Therefore, because different race parents are
just as capable of facilitating emotional growth within their custodial child
as same race guardians, the best interests standard should be tailored to
explicitly exclude the consideration of race in custody determinations.
transracially adopted children, generally speaking, experience good emotional development.").
105 Bartholet, supra note 16, at 1209.
106 See, e.g., Grow & Shapiro, supra note 104, at 412 (finding that the study revealed a
significantly low number of children were negatively affected by transracial adoption); see also
Howard, supra note 84, at 536 (noting that two caveats existed which may make Grow and Shapiro's
number even lower: first, the problems noted in children studied may have resulted from "emotional
scars" caused by "longer periods of time in foster care and . . . more frequent moves," and may not be
the result of transracial placement, and second, the noted problems in the subject children may be the
result of societal prejudices and stereotypes, and not the transracial placement).
107 Reisman, 843 F. Supp. at 361. This particular study, conducted by Dr. Simon, spanned twenty
years and involved 204 groups of white parents who had adopted at least one non-white child. Id Dr.
Simon conducted interviews of all children involved when they were between the ages of four and
seven, and tracked each family and child as much as possible in subsequent years. Id. In her expert
testimony as a witness in the Reisman case, Dr. Simon "opined that the race of an adoptive parent
should not be a factor in the adoption placement." Id.; Anjana Bahl, Color-Coordinated Families: Race
Matching in Adoption in the United States and Britain, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 53 (1996). "[Sleveral
empirical studies have confirmed the success of transracial adoptions, concluding that the children
adjust to their new family as well as those placed with a same-race family."
108 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988). The court in this case granted a preliminary injunction
submitted by the McLaughlins, the white foster parents, to have Raymond returned to them. Id A
number of medical experts testified as to Raymond's condition, all concluding that returning Raymond
to the McLaughlins would be in Raymond's best interests and would ameliorate his depression. Id.
109 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 940.
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C. Race as a Best Interests Factor Supposes that Same Race Placement
Provides the Subject Child with a Stronger Cultural Identity and
Thereby Promotes Racial Stereotypes
The best interests standard should be modified to eliminate race as a
factor in custody determinations because a guardian's race does not
automatically affect a child's development of cultural identity. Advocates
of race as a best interests factor contend that minority children placed with
non-minority guardians will "lose their [cultural] identity ... and suffer
adjustment problems as a result. They argue that white parents, no matter
how hard they try, simply cannot provide an environment in which the
child can retain or develop his or her [cultural] identity."1' 0 Therefore,
permitting the use of race as a best interests factor assumes that same race
guardians are better suited to aid a child in developing a distinct cultural
identity. However, children of a minority race who are raised by white
parents may just as easily develop a unique sense of cultural identity as
those children who are raised by mixed or minority race parents. 111 For
example, a study performed over the course of twenty years of 204 white
parents who had adopted at least one non-white child revealed that
"children did not have problems with racial identity as a result of their
placement in a home of another race."112 Indeed, the majority of adopted
children living in interracial families enjoy a strong sense of self as well as
cultural heritage. 113 It is, therefore, logical to assume that the race of a
guardian seeking custody has no significant effect on the ability of that
guardian to develop within his or her child a distinct sense of self and
appreciation for his or her child's culture.
Concededly, not all non-minority guardians could successfully promote
110 Howard, supra note 84, at 538 (discussing black and Indian children raised in white
households). See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 926 (noting that "[The NABSW] argues that a black
child needs to be raised by black parents in order to develop a positive racial identity.").
111 See generally Jehnna Irene Hanan, Comment, The Best Interest of the Child: Eliminating
Discrimination in the Screening of Adoptive Parents, 27 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 167, 196 (1997).
"[M]ost adopted children in interracial families have a sense of identity and cultural heritage."
Bartholet, supra note 16, at 1209. "With astounding uniformity ... research shows transracial adoption
working well from the viewpoint of the children and the adoptive families involved. The children are
doing well in terms of such factors as achievement, adjustment, and self-esteem."
112 Reisman, 843 F. Supp. at 361.
113 Hanan, supra note 111, at 196 ("Studies show that seventy-five percent of interracially adopted
children adjust well in their adoptive families and have the same levels of self-esteem as other
children."); see generally Arnold R. Silverman, Outcomes of Transracial Adoption, 3 THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN - ADOPTION 104, 104 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D., ed., 1993) ("Most transracial adoptees
have a sense of identity with their racial heritage.").
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the development of strong cultural identity in minority children, as "[ilt
may be difficult, if not impossible, for white parents to raise their children
in a culture foreign to their own."114 For this reason, race-matching
advocates, like the NABSW, promote best interests decisions based upon
race to the exclusion of all other factors.1 15 However, many white parents
and guardians have successfully instilled in their black or biracial children
significant cultural pride,1l6 indicating that, absent a few exceptions, the
race of a custodial guardian is irrelevant and the desire of a guardian to
encourage such pride in the child is truly important. "The strength of this
sense of identity depends on the . . . parents' efforts to foster it,"117
meaning that if a parent desires to encourage such development, a child can
effectively acquire cultural appreciation and identification. This may be
done through various means, such as providing the child with informational
materials regarding the child's culture, familiarizing the child with
individuals similar to the child's ethnicity, and surrounding the child with a
non-judgmental and accepting environment. 118
Further support for the elimination of race as a best interests factor in
custody determinations is the fact that "not all black families identify with
black culture, nor would they provide such a cultural setting for their
children."11 9 Presuming that minority children will develop stronger
cultural identities with minority parents than with white parents "buys into
and perpetuates racial stereotypes, a notion which inevitably works against
those who are stereotyped." 20 Therefore, to suppose that children are
better served with parents of their own race is to enforce the belief in those
children that they will only develop emotionally and culturally if they are
cared for by parents with whom they resemble physically. This Note
114 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 948.
115 Id.; see Howard, supra note 84, at 538 (noting the position of transracial adoption opponents
that white parents cannot properly foster ethnic identity).
116 See Hanan, supra note 111, at 200 (observing that "white parents are as able as any other
parents to give their children a positive sense of themselves racially and individually."). See generally
Bartholet, supra note 16, at 1209 (stating that studies regarding transracial adoption conclude that non-
white children placed with white families "developed strong senses of racial identity").
117 Hanan, supra note 111, at 196.
118 Id. at 196-97. Consider Reisman v. Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs., in which a witness - a
Caucasian woman who had adopted two biracial girls - testifying for the plaintiffs, explained that to
accommodate the biracial heritage of her biracial daughters, she and her husband moved from one
suburban community to another which was more integrated, both residentially and from a public school
standpoint. 843 F. Supp. 356, 362 (W.D. Tenn. 1993). The same witness testified that she and her
family meet monthly for potluck dinners with a group of interracial families. Id.
119 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 948. See Goforth, supra note 82, at 38 (noting that "Black
parents will not always rear their children in accordance with the NABSW's ideas of what constitutes
appropriate Black culture").
120 Goforth, supra note 82, at 38.
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proposes that instilling this belief in a child will undoubtedly affect that
child down the road by creating the assumption that individuals of his or
her own race are the only individuals who truly understand him or her.
Such a belief furthers the racial prejudices and stereotypes that have
become all too common in our society.
Assuming that a Caucasian parent would not be able to aid a black or
biracial child in developing a unique cultural identity is equivalent to
assuming that a male parent would not be able to help a female child
develop a secure sense of self and identification with the female gender.
Both assumptions are baseless; there is no valid reason to presume that a
parent - simply because of his or her exterior appearance - would lack the
ability to facilitate the development of a healthy identity within his or her
child. Thus, the best interests standard should be tailored to explicitly
exclude race as a factor in custody proceedings.
III. THE PROPOSED GOAL: A COLORBLIND COURT
As discussed above, the use of race as a factor in determining the best
interests of a child in custody proceedings is more detrimental than
beneficial. Not only does the consideration of race in best interests
determinations negatively affect the subject child and the guardians seeking
custody of the subject child, but such consideration also harms society by
reinforcing societal prejudices and stereotypes. For these reasons, the best
interests standard should be modified to unambiguously prohibit the
consideration of race in child custody decisions. Should courts decide to
completely dispel race as a factor in children's best interests
determinations, this Note suggests, the legal system, families dealing with
custody issues, and society as a whole will reap the benefits. Barring race
as a best interests consideration would limit racial intolerance and
discrimination.121 Additionally, courts would be forced to examine other,
much more pertinent factors when making their determinations regarding
child custody - a situation that would ultimately lead to a better life for the
child at hand. Thus, courts, when making best interests determinations in
custody decisions, should never consider race.
121 See Bartholet, supra note 16, at 1248 ("[T]ransracial adoptive families constitute an interesting
model of how we might better learn to live with one another in this society. These families can work
only if there is appreciation of racial difference, and love that transcends such difference. And the
evidence indicates that these families do work."); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 965 ("A transracially
placed child . .. is in the best position to see the commonality between Black and white people and the
irrationality of racial barriers to communication, respect, and understanding.").
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A. Modifying the Best Interests Standard by Eliminating the Consideration
ofRace May Reduce Societal Prejudices and Biases
Amending the best interests standard by prohibiting the use of race as a
factor in custody proceedings may help to limit racial prejudices and
stereotypes.122 Surely, as the Palmore court noted, "[i]t would ignore
reality to suggest that racial and ethnic prejudices do not exist."123 This
does not mean, however, that courts should allow such societal views to
factor into their determinations and permit these prejudices to persist.
Instead, prohibiting the consideration of race in best interests
determinations may help to "bridge the gap between black and white
people and may reduce racial tension and the discriminatory obstacles to
opportunities that [minorities] continue to encounter in American
society." 24 Recall McLaughlin v. Pernsley,125 in which a young black boy
experienced severe depression when the family court removed him from
the white family with whom he had been living and placed him with a
family who shared his race. As Judge Hannum stated in Pernsley,
"Deciding [the subject child]'s placement not on the basis of his race, but
on the quality of his relationships [with the contesting parties], will
advance the strong public interest in overcoming racial discrimination and
will promote the goal that citizens be treated according to their individual
human qualities."126
Not only would society benefit from the elimination of race as a best
interests factor, but the children involved in custody proceedings would
benefit as well. As the court noted in In re Kramer, a case decided in Iowa
inl980, "[i]f... children are raised in a happy and stable home, they will
be able to cope with prejudice and hopefully learn that people are unique
individuals who should be judged as such." 27 Not only could transracial
placement teach children to be less race-conscious, 128 but it could also
122 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 965 (noting that awarding custody to a parent of a different
race, if the parent meets the best interests standard based on factors other than race, may "reduce racism
by increasing understanding through integration"). Howard, supra note 84, at 540 (explaining a study
that found that "white and non-white children raised in mixed-race families were less likely to have pro-
white attitudes or to associate 'white' with positive and desirable characteristics than were both white
and non-white children generally").
123 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
124 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 965.
125 693 F. Supp. 318, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
126 Race Barred in Placing a Child, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1988, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/25/garden/race-barred-in-placing-a-child.html.
127 297 N.W.2d 359, 361-62 (Iowa 1980) (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreisher, 450
Pa. 352, 356 (1973)).
128 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 12, at 953-54 (stating that "white parents, by deemphasizing
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enable a child to better cope with racism, as a non-minority parent's denial
of a minority race's "inferiority may be more believable because it is less
self-serving . . . [and] will appear to be solely to support and show love for
this child." 29
Therefore, should courts heed Judge Hannum's words and modify the
best interests standard by eliminating race as a factor in custody cases,
society as a whole may improve as racial minorities encounter fewer racial
prejudices and experience less discrimination. Quite eloquently stated by
Elizabeth Bartholet, a Harvard Law School professor, 130 transracial
placement advocate, 131 and mother of two adopted boys from Peru: 132
[O]ne can recognize the importance of racial and cultural difference
without subscribing to separatism. One can celebrate a child's racial
identity without insisting that the child born with a particular racial
make-up must live within a prescribed racial community. One can
recognize that there are an endless variety of ways individual
members of various racial groups choose to define their identities
and to define themselves in relationship to racial and other groups.
One can believe that people are fully capable of loving those who
are not biological and racial likes, but are 'other,' and that it is
important that more learn to do so. One can see the elimination of
racial hostilities as more important than the promotion of cultural
difference.133
B. Modifying the Best Interests Standard by Eliminating the Consideration
ofRace May Compel Courts to Consider Relevant Factors
Forcing courts to reject race as a factor in best interests determinations
may help them focus on factors which legitimately affect a child's well
being. It is clear that a judge's personal "unconscious and uncountered
racism in custody determinations can skew placements so that race
becomes determinative and other factors relevant to the child's best
interests remain unexplored." 34 Further, as previously noted, even if courts
obey Palmore's holding and do not consider race to the exclusion of other
race, may enable a Black child to cope better with racial attacks because the child may view the attacks
less personally."); see also Dov Fox, Note, Racial Classification in Assisted Reproduction, 118 YALE
L.J. 1844, 1892 n.236 (2009) (citing research and studies showing benefits to children of transracial
adoption).
129 Id. at 954.
130 Bartholet, supra note 16, at 1163.
131 Id at 1248.
132 Id. at 1166-68.
133 Id at 1247-48.
134 Pollack, supra note 83, at 615.
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factors, race may still end up being determinative. Surely, there is not any
"analytic substance to the distinction between using race as a 'sole' factor
and using it to 'tip scales' that would otherwise be balanced differently."l 35
Therefore, in a significant number of custody cases where race is
considered, other relevant factors are not significantly taken into account.
This Note suggests that, should judges consider these other factors,
different determinations might be reached.
As noted above, by considering race, a court assumes that same-race
parents would be better equipped to place at ease a child who is confronted
with racial prejudices. In addition to reasons already discussed, this
assumption is faulty because while parents should aim to "provide the love
and nurturing to help overcome the hurt that society might impose upon a
biracial person,"l 36 a prerequisite to providing such comfort to a child in
need is surely not a certain complexion or physical appearance. This Note
offers that if a parent or guardian is devoted and caring, and can provide for
and meet the needs of the subject child, that child's best interests will
undoubtedly be served. Therefore, by tailoring the best interests standard
to proscribe the consideration of race in custody determinations, judges
may instead focus on those factors which are truly telling of a potential
guardian's capabilities of providing for the child's interests.
CONCLUSION
While racial discrimination undeniably exists in America today, it
important to recognize the significant advances that have been made
through the destruction of various hurdles that have previously prevented
minorities from achieving the same goals as their non-minority
counterparts. Certainly, as Barack Obama prepares to become our forty-
fourth President, 137 so too must we prepare to continue charging ahead,
refusing to focus on color, and instead opting to focus on the person behind
that color. It only follows, then, that state courts keep up, deciding cases
based upon relevant facts and not upon personal or societal biases. By
modifying the best interests standard to eliminate the consideration of race
as a best interests factor in custody determinations, as this Note suggests,
judges will be forced to concentrate instead on those factors that will truly
135 David D. Meyer, Lecture: Palmore Comes of Age: The Place of Race in the Placement of
Children, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 183, 194 (2007).
136 Reisman v. State Dep't of Human Servs., 843 F. Supp. 356, 364 (W.D. Tenn. 1998).
137 See, e.g., Nagourney, supra note 5 (reporting on Barack Obama winning the 2008 election to
become the 44th president of the United States).
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serve the subject child's best interest. Further, in doing so, as this Note
points out, decisions made without any consideration of race may help to
reduce societal prejudices and discrimination. Elimination of race as a
factor in custody proceedings will not only help society, but will also better
serve the subject child's best interests - the true goal of the family court in
custody cases.

